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Abstract
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it Facebook, Instagram, or even a basic search engine like Google; a technology firm from the West
attempting to crack the Chinese market is ordinarily met with a wall of government restrictions. So how
can social networking sites globalize in the face of increasing regulation and censorship? More narrowly,
how can professional networking websites find success in China and be beneficial to users?

Keywords
LinkedIn, China, social media, social networking, professional networking, regulation

This article is available in The Park Place Economist: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol23/iss1/13

Mishra

Globalizing Social Media: A Study of
LinkedIn in China
Lisa Mishra
Navigating the Chinese market is a near
impossible task for most American social media
companies. Be it Facebook, Instagram, or even a basic
search engine like Google; a technology firm from
the West attempting to crack the Chinese market is
ordinarily met with a wall of government restrictions.
So how can social networking sites globalize in the
face of increasing regulation and censorship? More
narrowly, how can professional networking websites
find success in China and be beneficial to users?
I. Background
The continued global success of social networking sites (SNSs) has made China an ideal market
for Western firms to explore. Its wealth of technology-savvy young people with access to social networking media such as computers and cellular devices
makes for a mutually beneficial relationship between
users and firms. Not only does China have the largest
online population of any country in the world at over
500 million users, it is also a leader in telecommunications and mobile devices (Arsène, 2012).
Moreover, the government of China even
formally espouses the growth of Internet and technology use. The Information Office of the State Council
of the People’s Republic of China officially states that
the Internet “is helping promote the economic and
social development of China,” while also helping “to
publicize government information” to citizens. These
same offices guarantee Chinese citizens freedom of
speech on the Internet, stating that “authorities attach great importance to social conditions and public
opinion as reflected on the Internet” (2010). And yet,
despite these claims of complete freedom of speech
and the merits of Internet use, China notoriously has
a marred reputation of welcoming foreign SNSs with

open arms.
II. Censorship in China
The history of Western technology companies
in China has been anything but painless in recent
years. China’s intense censorship laws have made
it so that several websites allowing pro-democracy
and revolutionary free speech are either partially or
completely inaccessible to users. A study conducted
by the Berkman Center for Internet and Society
found that 20% of all websites on the Internet have
been blocked in some way from China’s servers
(Martin). One such website, and the first major SNS
to experience a blockage from China, was Facebook.
Following the success of mass social media organization during the Arab Spring, Chinese Facebook
users from the independence movement of Xinjiang
orchestrated the 2009 Ürümqi riots. Sensing Facebook as a threat, the government officially blocked
the website entirely in 2009 and has not lifted the ban
since (Bass, 2009). CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s recent
visits to China have indicated Facebook’s interest in
returning to China, although not at the expense of
“free expression that is the backbone of Internet life”
(Mozur & Goel, 2014).
Another such website that has experienced
difficulties with censorship in China is YouTube.
Following riots in Tibet and possible videos showing
the harassment of Tibetans at the hands of Chinese
policemen, China officially banned access to YouTube in 2009 (Chang, 2009). In fact, the word “Tibet”
itself is blocked from search engines along with other
phrases related to independent movements within the
country.
In order to uphold their commitments to
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freedom of speech and Internet use, China has introduced alternative SNSs in place of Western websites that are easier to regulate. Instead of YouTube,
Chinese viewers may use Youku. As a direct result of
China’s YouTube ban, Youku is the most used video
hosting service in China and boasts 500 million active users. Likewise, Chinese users can opt for RenRen if they want an experience similar to Facebook
(Marketing Land Infographics, 2012). The success
of these websites comes from their internal, Chinese
operation. This makes regulation easier, as functioning within the constraints of Chinese censorship
is mandatory. It also makes communication fluid,
where it may have been lacking with Western SNSs.
When a website must remove sensitive content, there
need not be a middleman; communication is directly
between Chinese firms and the regulators they are
answerable to.
III. LinkedIn and Human Capital
Thus far, I have discussed technology and
media outlets that are recreational and used largely
for social purposes. However, there exists an emerging subset of SNSs that are professional in nature.
LinkedIn is perhaps the most successful such service.
LinkedIn, founded in Mountain View, California in
2003 is a business-oriented social networking site. It
is designed to help build a user’s professional identity
and to discover professional opportunities, business
deals, and new ventures. LinkedIn works similarly to
job search services in that it is built to provide users advantageous labor market outcomes (relative
to non-users). Ideally, users are expected to connect
with potential employers and secure work through
these interactions.
IV. LinkedIn in China
As mentioned earlier, social networking sites
seeking to enter the Chinese market must be prepared to deal with the heavy censorship that comes
with such a partnership. LinkedIn is one of the few
American SNSs that has successfully begun to do
business with China. Perhaps because of its narrow
focus as a professional tool, it inherently has less need
for censorship than a purely social website. However,
this does not mean that LinkedIn has not given up
considerable free expression rights in order to maintain its presence in China.

When it introduced its Chinese language
version earlier this year in February, LinkedIn saw
one million people join in addition to the already
four million that were using the unblocked Englishlanguage site (Mozur & Goel, 2014). However, prodemocracy and anti-government stances that were
expressed were trafficked, as they would be on most
websites in China. These posts would be blocked to
all users throughout China, although they could be
seen elsewhere around the world. Using software algorithms and human reviewers, LinkedIn makes sure
that it is free of politically sensitive topics.
Additionally, some of LinkedIn China’s success can be related to its use of Chinese companies
as channels of communication. LinkedIn China has
given up 7% of its operations to two local venture
capital firms, a crucial step to making sure there are
ways to notify the American business of any obstacles
they may face with the Chinese government (Mozur
& Goel, 2014). The adjustments LinkedIn has been
able to make upon entering the Chinese market have
been largely successful and it continues to function
without any overall website bans.
V. Policy Implications
Professional social networking sites, like their
social counterparts, should commit themselves to
free expression. If indeed American SNSs want to
enter the Chinese market, they must strike stronger
agreements to attain these freedoms. One suggestion
is that in exchange for greater shares of operation to
local Chinese firms, professional SNSs be allowed to
operate free of censorship laws. This could be mutually beneficial, promoting local Chinese business
growth while reaping greater benefits for site users
through direct and open communication.
VI. Conclusion
Despite the relative success LinkedIn has had
in China it can be argued that because of government
regulated blockages on “sensitive” topics, users are
not getting the full experience of utilizing a professional SNS. Such blockages inevitably hinder the
website’s mission of networking by disallowing users
from freely communicating with one another. The
censorship laws also inhibit potential employers from
considering hires authentically, because their genuine
opinions are not being reflected. If Chinese employ-
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ers have regulated channels of communication with
their potential hires, their judgment of these hires
will be skewed.
Studies have shown that high limitations on
censorship have been the cause of failure for many
SNSs in China (Martin). LinkedIn has a dubious
future in China because although it may be currently
balancing Chinese censorship with user freedoms, it
will ultimately be inadequately servicing its clients.
It will be unappealing to recruiters seeking authentic communication with potential employees and
inefficient in building networks if interactions are
censored. Despite Chinese user interest, government
regulation ultimately decides Linkedin’s future in the
country.
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